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Abstract: The provision and delivery of many of the services that modern society enjoys are the result of 
ubiquitous critical infrastructure systems that permeate across many sectors of the Australian community. 
Moreover, the integration of technological enhancements and networking interconnections between critical 
infrastructure systems has heightened system interdependence, availability and resilience, including the effIcient 
delivery of services to consumers within Australia's industrialised society. This research delivers a system 
security analysis and system modelling framework tool based on an associated conceptual methodology as the 
basis for assessing security and conceptually modelling a critical infrastructure system incident. The intent to 
identify potential system security issues and gain operational insights that will contribute to improving system 
reSilience, contingency planning development applicable to disaster recovery and ameliorating incident 
management responses for Australian critical infrastructure system incidents. 
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1. Introduction 
Historically, Australia's infrastructure was originally owned and operated by the public sector at the 
federal, state and local government levels (Smith, 2004), however the majority of Australia's critical 
infrastructure has been privatised with as much as 90% of the critical infrastructure under private 
sector ownership in some areas (TISN, 2004a; Allard, 2008). Some common exarnples of critical 
infrastructure systems and services that people rely upon include such essential services as 
electricity, water, health services, telecommunications and banking to name a few (AGD, 2008), yet 
what defines an infrastructure as critical in the Australian context. 
The Australian contextual definition of critical infrastructure as defined by the Trusted Information 
Sharing Network (TISN) is as follows. "Critical infrastructure is defined as those physical facilities, 
supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded 
or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact on the social or economic 
well-being of the nation, or affect Australia's ability to conduct national defence and ensure national 
security" (TISN, p.3, 2004b; NCTC, 2004; AGD, 2008). 
Importantly, in the context of this definition, "Significant is defined as an event or incident that puts at 
risk the public safety and confidence, threatens our economic security, harms Australia's international 
competitiveness, or impedes the continuity of government and its services" (TISN, p.3, 2004b). 
This briefly defines and outlines an interpretation of critical infrastructure from the Australian 
perspective as a prelude to further discussing critical infrastructure in the context of a systems 
environment. Then a generic methodological approach is proposed as the foundation of an ensuing 
framework for the practical system security analYSis and modelling of critical infrastructure incidents, 
in seeking to determine a response to the question of: how to critique and model critical infrastructure 
systems? 
2. Critical infrastructures: a systems environment 
The dominate architecture of distributed infrastructure network systems is typically spanning long 
distances in the provision of infrastructure services from increasingly centralised production modes 
(Zimmerman, 2004) and be it direct connectivity, policies and procedures or geographic proximity, 
most critical infrastructure systems interact. The ability to do this is a result of the complex 
dependency relationships and interdependency relationships that cut across infrastructure boundaries 
(Pederson et aI, 2006). 
Furthermore, the concept of critical infrastructure connection is important to a wide range of social, 
economic and political issues depending on the potential implications and state of these reciprocal 
connections. In this context, the beneficial influences of two or more interconnected entities is the 
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exchange of ideas, information, currency and other valuable goods and services that are for mutual 
benefit (Murray & Grubesic, 2007). 
However, typically these infrastructures operate in a physical environment that is reflective not only of 
the individual inputs, outputs and states, but also influenced by other infrastructure behaviours and 
characteristics. Add to this the context in which owners and operators are pushing their own goals 
and objectives, constructing value systems for defining and viewing their businesses, analysing and 
developing models of their operation, and making decisions that impinge upon infrastructure 
architectures and operations. Even the operational state and physical condition of infrastructures 
influence the environment that in turn influences stress and demand on individual infrastructures; in 
these terms the environment and the infrastructure systems are interdependently linked (Rinaldi et aI, 
2001; Brown et aI, 2004; Peters et aI, 2008). 
Another aspect of the systems environment is the heterogeneous aspects of infrastructures and the 
fragmentation between infrastructure systems where the connections via large technical systems 
enable the different systems to technologically coexist and function cooperatively. With such an array 
of differing systems and purposes a realisation is that the collapse of services from these systems 
would be potentially disastrous for entire economies and societies (de Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007). 
In terms of critical infrastructure systems particularly, there has been some disagreement between 
scholars and experts in the field, but the body of work shares some common aspirational 
characteristics (Egan 2007): 
• Creating reliability over multiple management generations in complex, tightly coupled systems is 
difficult and extraordinarily demanding; 
• The hope of doing so grows increasingly distant as technological systems grow larger and more 
complex. 
In addition to these two characteristics, as infrastructure systems increase in criticality, through 
societal reliance, they produce potentially greater security vulnerabilities. The proliferation of large, 
complex and tightly coupled systems, especially in private critical infrastructure management has led 
to an ongoing discussion across disciplinary lines about how to manage them for optimal reliability, 
security and resilience (de Bruijne et a/2006; Egan 2007). 
It remains that there will always be security issues involving large technical systems that involve 
varying combinations of hard technologies (pipes, pumps, wires, ducts etc.) and soft technologies 
(computer software, networks and the Internet etc.). Add to this the human operator including the 
human-machine interface and complex network topologies and architectures, the dependency and 
interdependency relationships between the internal operations of the systems and the external 
influences of the environment in which these infrastructures are situated (Balkovich & Anderson 2004, 
Egan, 2007). 
Therefore, critical infrastructure systems tend to be interdependent and even interconnected and 
hence a systems failure, be it through natural disaster, sabotage or poor management can bring 
entire communities, their industries and utilities to a grinding halt. Just imagine for example, a major 
electricity failure can bring just about everything to a stop, from transport to workplaces, water 
supplies, telecommunications and transport hubs that would cause widespread disruption and 
damage (Bentley, 2006). 
3. This research inquiry 
Therefore as a systems environment, the ability to analyse and critique the security aspects together 
with modelling critical infrastructure systems offers an avenue for assessing crttical infrastructure 
system incidents, to identify vulnerabilities and locate inherent weaknesses; thus enabling the 
development and implementation of appropriate solutions and remedial action to mitigate such 
security risks to system availability and service supply. 
One possible solution may lay in the development of a generic multifaceted or blended 
methodological approach that outlines the adoption of multiple system analysis and system modelling 
approaches, as a hybrid methodology that would combine multiple approaches as a single, 
multifaceted practical application for the system security analysis and system modelling of a critical 
infrastructure system incident. 
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4. System analysis and blended methodological approaches 
Obviously the characteristics of systems vary considerably and are largely the result of the type of 
system, open or closed and the external environment that interacts and influences the system 
functionally generally. Additionally, the relationships and influences exerted between subsystems 
within internal environment of systems also have a part to play in comprehending the subject system's 
functionality and responses to differing and changing situations. 
In general terms, applying system security analysis or system modelling approaches represents an 
interpretive concept of the real world system (Berntsen et ai, nd) that provide a means of viewing the 
important aspects or the essence of the system at various levels, depending on the particular system 
modelling theme. 
Common system modelling and analysis themes are as follows (Avison, 2003a): 
• A three-level view, where the conceptual level is a descriptive high-level overview of the system 
domain, the logical level describing the system goals and intention, while the physical level 
describes the system itself including the technologies involved; 
• The process modelling theme describes the logical analysis of the processes within the system 
and is a discipline that applies a basic technique of functional decomposition, which breaks down 
a complex problem into smaller, more manageable detail; 
• The data analysis theme involves comprehending and documenting the data elements and their 
relationships within the system; 
• The object-orientated theme models objects that represent elements of the system including 
people, data, processes and the interaction of these objects. 
These approach themes are each applicable to general system analysis or system modelling in the 
terms of their specific characteristics of application however; there is no singular theme that nominally 
fits well in addressing the entire issue of critiquing and modelling critical infrastructure systems. 
4.1 Blending methodological approaches 
Principally, a single methodology provides a set of detailed rules and guidelines to follow for achieving 
a highly focused and speCific outcome that is the result of a highly structured, narrow approach to the 
speCific task they are intended to address (Avison, 2003b). Therefore, the logical extension lies in 
utilising a number of individual approaches in combination, to bring together the characteristics of 
each specific method to address individually their specific area of expertise to meet the overall criteria 
and intention of the practical critiquing and modelling of critical infrastructure systems (Wood-Harper 
et ai, 1985). Therefore, a blended approach utilising multiple system analysis and system modelling 
approaches in combination would conceivably bring together the characteristics of each that is 
applicable to the achieving the overall research goal of a method suitable for critiquing and modelling 
critical infrastructure systems. 
4.2 System analysis modelling 
Other modelling approaches related to information system analysis include: (Dennis et ai, 2009): 
• Functional Modelling is a description of the processes and the interaction of the system with its 
environment; 
• Structural Modelling is a conceptual description of the structure of the data supporting the 
processes and presents the logical organisation of data without focussing on the technical details 
of how the data is stored, created or manipulated; 
• Behavioural Modelling describes the internal dynamic aspects of a system that support the 
processes by describing the internal logic of the processes without specifying the process 
implementation. 
While these approaches may not necessarily be directly applicable to this research in terms of 
critiquing and modelling critical infrastructure systems, there are elements of these approaches that 
are complimentary to system analysis and the prinCiples of system modelling, as applied to critical 
infrastructure systems. 
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5. A generic blended methodology 
The following conceptual multifaceted or blended methodology outlines a generic methodological 
approach for the system security analysis and system modelling of critical infrastructure system 
incidents. The approach consists of a five phase process that combines the various system analysis 
and system modelling methods together in a complementary manner that utilises and takes 
advantage of the strengths of each individual methodology. The generic conceptual methodology 
shown in Figure 1 illustrates each individual phase of the multifaceted methodology, suitable for 
incorporating a combination of multiple system analysis and system modelling approaches for 
critiquing and modelling of critical infrastructure systems. 
System Security AnalYSis (1) 
Critical Infrastructure System Case Study Development (2) 
System Model Design (3) 
Conceptual System Model Development (4) 
System Model Analysis and System Report (5) 
Figure 1: Generic conceptual methodology 
Figure 1 presents a formalised version of the generic conceptual methodology incorporating the 
feedback loop from the conclusions of Phase Five as a means of checking, amending and reviewing 
the initial Phase One and Two system analysis of the blended methodology. This circular revision 
process would only require the number of iterations as deemed necessary by the analyst. 
The system security analYSis and modelling methodology outlines the generic multifaceted system 
analysis and system modelling approach that would be suitable as the basis for a practical framework 
incorporating various chosen system analysis and modelling approaches, for the practical task of 
critiquing and modelling critical infrastructure systems. 
6. T ARDIS framework 
The Targeted Analysis Representation of Distributed Infrastructure Systems (TAROIS) Framework 
represents a practical procedural framework for assessing the system security aspects and modelling 
of critical infrastructure system incidents. This process culminates with the production of a System 
Report outlining the system security improvement considerations for the critical infrastructure system 
incident. The TAROIS framework design shown in Figure 2 represents a practical approach suitable 
for critiquing and modelling a critical infrastructure system incident utilising a combined system 
security analysis, system modelling and analysis approach as shown: 
The principle application of the TAROIS framework is to apply system security analysis and system 
modelling techniques to investigate historical critical infrastructure system incidents from a 
perspective of focussing on system security and resilience. 
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Figure 2: The TARDIS framework 
7. Alternative system security analysis methods 
To understand the idiosyncratic behaviours and responses of systems it is vitally important to gain an 
insight into the nature and functionality of the subject systems. A 'systems approach' is a means of 
taking a rational approach to managing system complexities that is necessary for the realisation and 
development of alternative solutions, together with choosing those promising optimisations for 
maximum efficiency and minimal cost that exist within the complex network of interactions of the 
overall system (Bertalanffy, 1968). 
Quite simply, system analysis is the pragmatic investigation of a system problem with the goal of 
determining a suitable resolution that will solve the initial problem. The process generally consists of 
defining the problem, identifying the cause, developing and specifying the solution, applying the 
solution and identifying the information requirements as met by the system solution. This typifies an 
information systems analysis approach that describes what a system should do and it is system 
design that demonstrates how the system will fulfil this objective (Laudon & Laudon, 2007). 
System security is a complex discipline incorporating informational, organisational and technological 
factors. There are many different approaches to systems analysis and the following briefly outlines a 
few of the system analysis methods that principally focus on applying a security analysis approach to 
the subject system, and are therefore of comparative interest to determining the idiosyncratic 
behaviours and responses of systems from a security perspective. 
7.1 OCTAVE 
With the increaSing application of technology, complexity and the global network aspects of the 
information assets enVironment, presents numerous potential security issues in relation to the 
ownership and custodianship of information, both within and across organisational boundaries 
(Stevens, 2005). The intention of the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) approach is to guide organisational personnel through an evaluation process in 
consideration of the complexity of organisational and technological issues to identify, comprehend 
and address security risk issues. (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001 b). 
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The OCTAVE analysis process provides a systematic guide to assessing information security risks 
within an organisation, with the goal of developing an appropriate protection strategy for an effective 
information security program to mitigate the risks identified. Through adopting this approach, 
organisations can identify, understand and appreciate their current security status and utilise it as a 
process for benchmarking improvement. OCTAVE guides the identification of the essential 
components via a comprehensive, systematic, context-driven information security risk evaluation 
targeting large organisations (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a; Woody, 2006). 
OCTAVE is a security risk management approach and there are numerous standards, practices, 
methods and recommendations for addressing information security risks. However, the effectiveness 
of OCTAVE depends on an organisation, selecting the most appropriate action with regard to the laws 
and regulations, organisational goals, management practices and policies that define the 
organisational boundaries within which security risk management must abide (Woody, 2006). 
7.2 SAA 
The Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA) method is a practical process that enables a systematic 
assessment of the survivability characteristics and properties of proposed systems, existing systems 
and modifications to existing systems. This system analysis approach focuses primarily at the 
architectural level of the system and provides a means for an organisation to comprehend survivability 
within their particular operating context. The SSA consists of a cooperative team consisting of system 
architects, developers and stakeholders and proceeds through a number of joint sessions, 
culminating in a briefing on findings and recommendations (CERT, 2002). 
In brief, the SSA method consists of four steps (Ellison et ai, 1999; CERT; 2002): 
• System definition; 
• Essential capability definition; 
• Compromisable capability definition; and 
• Survivability analysis. 
The primary focus of system survivability is to deliver essential services and preserve essential 
assets, including those system capabilities that are critical to the system achieving its mission goals in 
a continuing manner. Survivability itself is reliant on three capabilities of reSistance, recognition and 
recovery where (Ellison et ai, 1998; CERT, 2002; Mead, 2002): 
• Resistance is the system ability to repel attacks; 
• Recognition is the ability to detect attacks as they occur and to evaluate the extent of damage and 
compromise to the subject system; and 
• Recovery is the capability of a system to maintain essential services and assets during an attack, 
limit damage and recover to full service provision after the attack subsides. 
The benefits of the SSA method are to raise awareness of potential survivability exposures within an 
organisation's operational systems and provide a guide for addressing survivability and system 
security before the fact, rather than after the consequences of an attack. The SSA method offers an 
extensive framework for identifying essential and vulnerable system components. Yet there remain 
few examples of the SSA process for the analysis of security and survivability of real-time control 
systems used in critical infrastructures (Benke et ai, 2004). 
7.3 SAF 
Increasingly essential work processes are spanning multiple systems that are geographically 
distributed and independently managed and furthermore, business organisations are demanding 
greater adaptability that is resulting in a constantly changing mix of systems and organisational 
processes (Ellison & Woody, 2007). 
In this environment where systems within systems are providing services, there is the possibility that 
this may create adverse usage patterns that affect the overall system functionality that were not 
anticipated during the system design. From this perspective, systems and systems within systems can 
create failure states that are difficult to resolve because invariably the root cause may not be a single 
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factor, but the product of multiple systems failures including human error or unpredictable system 
emergent behaviour (Ellison & Woody, 2007). 
With this in mind, applying the Survivability Analysis Framework (SAF) at specific points in time 
enables an analysis and monitoring of the change in risk over time. The SAF with its emphasis on 
business processes enables improved traceability between business processes and technology risks 
and system design decisions, in consideration of and the requirements across, multiple organisational 
levels. However, the complexity of systems within systems, incorporating the diversity of mitigation 
strategies, remains the principle obstacle to the effective application of SAF as an analysis tool for 
determining system service assurance issues too. As it currently stands, SAF remains highly 
theoretical, requiring further research and development, external reviews and practical applications to 
generate improvement and understanding of the potential offerings and benefits that the SAF may yet 
deliver (Ellison & Woody, 2007). 
Accordingly there are many other methodological approaches applicable for undertaking security 
analysis of critical infrastructure system protection and resilience with respect to their 
interdependencies. However, this research has focused only on OCTAVE, SAA and SAF security 
analysis methodologies and found that while they are potentially suitable for analysing critical 
infrastructure systems they remain very narrow in their application and focus. 
8. Justification and relevance 
The principle intention of these system security analysis approaches is to determine an intricate 
understanding of the focal systems to identify and monitor potential system vulnerabilities and 
develop solutions. An additional approach to enhance the insights gained from system analysis into 
the functional characteristics, security and structural features of systems is to develop a model of the 
subject system that conceptually represents the focal, real-world system of interest for further 
investigation. 
Each of the aforementioned system security analysis approaches is specific in their own and offers a 
myopic insight and analysis approach that that is curtailed in the restricted scope of their application 
and this is why a blended approach was adopted to bring together and apply the key features of the 
system security analysis and modelling into a generic conceptual methodological approach as shown 
in Figure 1. Therefore, the intention of the generic methodological approach shown in Figure 1 is to 
deliver a methodology with a broader focus and application that is capable of utilising multiple system 
analysis approaches in combination with modelling the system of interest, as a means of delivering a 
wide ranging investigation of the particular critical infrastructure system and incident of interest. 
8.1 Incorporating system modelling 
In this research context the primary intention of system modelling is to utilise conceptual modelling as 
means of facilitating the comprehension of patterns of change, functionality and dynamic behaviours 
that a system exhibits over time and to identify the conditions that cause systems to remain stable or 
become unstable. Furthermore, through experimentation applied to system model parameters and 
characteristics, the knowledge derived can suggestively indicate what mayor may not translate into 
the real-world system situation. However, it is important to be mindful that the interpretation process 
of translating real-world systems and information into various model elements requires persistence 
and remains an inexact process, but applied trial and error and experiential judgement remain valid 
approaches to model development (Stacey, 1996). 
When it comes to modelling systems, systems thinking, system dynamics and systems analysis can 
all contribute to the development of a conceptual system model. In general terms of model 
development, the first step is to interpret the real-world system as a description, for instance, a 
description of systems dynamics may lead to an equation of an explicit system model, a simulation to 
understand dynamic behaviours, evaluation of alternative solutions, education and better policy 
choices and implementation (Forrester, 1998). Alternatively, model development from a system 
thinking perspective may require the development of descriptive case studies, though this lacks the 
discipline of an explicit model creation and simulation process and is reliant on utilising subjective 
impressions and intuition to evaluate complex system structures that may emerge as the description 
of the real-world system. Additionally, the benefits of systems analysis can contribute markedly to a 
detailed description of the real-world system necessary for developing a conceptual representation of 
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the physical system (ibid). Nevertheless, the emphasis is on eliciting information from the real-world 
situation and applying this with rigour and clarity to the production of a conceptual representational 
model of the real-world subject system, regardless of the modelling approach and medium utilised or 
system type. 
8.2 The proposed conceptual methodology and framework approach 
In terms of this research outcome, the methodology (Figure 1) and the practical TARDIS Framework 
(Figure 2) is the result of an appraisal of a number of individual system security analysis and system 
modelling approaches. The wider system security analysis approach incorporating system modelling 
offers a more flexible approach for the user to implement in their analysis of the security status and 
through system modelling of the functional dynamics within the system, as applicable to critical 
infrastructure system security and function. 
To this end the TARDIS Framework based on the multifaceted, generic conceptual methodology 
approach, in this instance utilises the Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA) as a practical process for 
systematically assessing the survivability characteristics and properties of proposed systems, existing 
systems and modifications to existing systems. SSA offers a four-step approach that enables the 
development of a system security and survivability profile that maps potential system weaknesses 
and points of compromise, through employing the SSA framework for identifying essential and 
vulnerable system components. This is a key feature, as the intent of critical infrastructure systems is 
similarly to maintain the supply of services in the face of system security threats, vulnerabilities and 
unexpected operational impOSitions. 
Furthermore, the suitability of SSA was demonstrated and assessed during a focus group, as part of 
the overall critiquing of the conceptual methodology and framework, including and its practical 
application. The focus group partiCipants were positive and supportive of the choice of SSA and its 
application in the context of a system analysis approach for assessing critical infrastructure system 
security, which further confirmed the premise that SSA was adaptable for analysing critical 
infrastructure systems from a security perspective. 
The interpretive Top-Down method approach for qualitative system modelling is utilised for the design 
planning activity in the TARDIS framework, as a precursor to the applied system modelling approach 
for the particular critical infrastructure system incident. The reason for using the Top-Down approach 
in this manner was that it was suitable for developing alternative world views and its reductive 
characteristic suits the interpretive development of the system model, particularly in terms of broadly 
defining the boundaries, connections and compartmentalising the system (Warren & Hutchinson, 
2005). 
The Top-Down approach is adaptable to the system model design and planning role in the TARDIS 
framework and provides a consistent planning structure for drafting an illustrative interpretation. The 
system decomposition feature delivers an incremental approach to detailing the lower-level 
subsystem and components of the system in preparation for developing various detailed conceptual 
system model representations of the critical infrastructure system. 
In terms of system modelling, there is any number of approaches that offered differing characteristics 
to the system modelling aspect of the TARDIS framework. The chosen system modelling approach in 
this instance was the Coloured Petri Net (CPN) methodology employing the CPNTools software 
system modelling environment. CPN system modelling is theoretically well founded and adaptable for 
application to discrete event systems characterised as network connected, distributed with 
concurrency issues and dynamic properties and operational processes; furthermore, CPN system 
modelling is utilised to design a broad range of systems and processes (Jensen, 1997; Jensen et aI, 
2007; Jensen, 2008). 
CPN modelling methodology was chosen for the TARDIS framework was the subject of an extensive 
examination by an initial first focus group, where CPN via CPNTools was applied to the modelling of a 
critical infrastructure system incident and demonstrated. The response of partiCipants to the applied 
CPN modelling was supportive of the approach taken and the outcomes delivered; furthermore, the 
response to CPN system modelling approach was also favourable in subsequent focus groups. 
Although CPN system modelling has been traditionally applied in small system settings such as 
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network communication, production process modelling and analysis, in terms of large system 
modelling in this instance, CPN is adaptable (Bobeanu et ai, 2004). 
Soft System Methodology (SSM) focuses on the analysis and modelling of qualitative actions and 
relations of human activity systems within a subject system. In this instance, the application of the 
SSM learning cycle is for comparative analysis of various critical infrastructure system scenarios 
developed during the CPN modelling process (Checkland, 1999 & 2000). 
This is an adaptation of the original SSM intention of analysing and modelling the qualitative human 
situations in comparison to the world view of the system, to one of overlaying of the technological 
system view in comparison to the world view of the critical infrastructure system. The second focus 
group observed that this adaptation of the SSM was a different and unexpected approach that had 
merit in the context of the practical framework. 
The aforementioned multifaceted approach adopted with the generic conceptual methodology (Figure 
1) and applied with the TARDIS Framework (Figure 2) attempts to utilise the benefits and advantages 
that each methodological approach brings with their own particular characteristics. Through this 
application the intention is that together they collectively provide a broad, adaptable and suitable 
approach for undertaking system security analysis and modelling of critical infrastructure system 
incidents. 
9. Conclusions 
This research presents a conceptual methodological approach for the system security analysis and 
system modelling of critical infrastructure system incidents in the Australian context. It outlines a 
generic approach for guiding the analysis of critical infrastructure system incidents that is receptive to 
enabling users to insert and apply appropriate system analysis and system modelling methodological 
choices into the subsequent methodological-based framework. 
Furthermore, the practical framework example presents and describes a pragmatic approach for 
undertaking a Targeted Analysis Representation of Distributed Infrastructure Systems (TARDIS) 
applicable to differing critical infrastructure incident contexts, from the global to organisational and the 
personal perspectives. The TARDIS framework is based on the proposed conceptual methodology 
and incorporates a multifaceted and systematic approach to the system security analysis and system 
modelling of critical infrastructure system incidents. Therefore, the TARDIS framework that provides a 
starting point as a practical means for critiquing and modelling critical infrastructure system incidents 
from a security perspective in a historic context as applicable to the Australian setting. 
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